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where as exactly as possible the original text. So far as we have been able to see his confidence is justified, although, drawing its material, as the work does, from so many special sciences, one can scarcely imagine a book in which the liability to mistakes is greater.¹ The second volume is supplied with a good index of subjects, to which an index of names might have been added. *A propos* of difficulties of translation, it would be an excellent practice, and no inconsiderable aid to future workers, if the translators of philosophical works would always add a glossary of the German terms for which we have no exact English equivalents and of which the translations vary, together with the renderings which they have adopted in each special case. The work belongs to the *Library of Philosophy*, edited by J. H. Muirhead.

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COMTE, MILL, AND SPENCER. AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY. By *John Watson, LL.D.* Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895. Pages, 302. Price, \$1.75.

There is a great danger just now, the author thinks, "that philosophy, in the large sense in which it was understood by Plato and Aristotle, should be lost in artificial divisions and in a mass of empirical detail." He has accordingly sought to indicate by the sub-title of his little work that he aims to present the fundamental elements of philosophy as a scientific discipline. In other words, he has sought to be "at once critical and constructive." His philosophical creed, which he denominates Intellectual Idealism, is "the doctrine that we are capable of knowing reality as it actually is, and that reality when so known is absolutely rational." The method by which he has attempted to enforce his views is "to show that the ideas "which lie at the basis of mathematics, physics, biology, psychology and ethics, "religion and art, are related to each other as developing forms or phases of one "idea—the idea of self-conscious reason. But, partly out of respect for their eminence, and partly as a means of orientation, both for myself and for the students "under my charge (for whom this Outline was originally prepared), I have examined "certain views of Comte, Mill, and Spencer—and also, I may add, of Darwin and "Kant—which appear to me inadequate."

Chapter I. states in excellent terms the problem of philosophy as conceived by the author, and sums up the distinctions between science proper and philosophy proper as follows :

"Firstly, science deals with objects as such, philosophy with the knowledge of "objects. Secondly, science assumes that real knowledge is possible, philosophy "inquires into the truth of that assumption. Thirdly, science deals with the relations of objects to one another, philosophy with their relations to existence as a

¹It may seem trivial, but it will perhaps be helpful in the correction of a possible second edition of the translation to state, that in a footnote on page 521, Vol. 2, *flagellatæ* and *dino-flagellatæ* should be *flagellata* and *dinoflagellata*.

"whole. More shortly, science treats of modes of existence, philosophy of existence in its completeness."

Chapter II. treats of the Philosophy of August Comte, where it appears that Comte's doctrine of the relativity of knowledge rests upon a fundamental contradiction separating "existence into two mutually exclusive parts, the phenomenal and the real," and assuming "two opposite kinds of intelligence." The two assumptions, according to Professor Watson, are self-contradictory. He proposes "to start from the principle that there is one intelligible universe and one kind of intelligence." Chapters III., IV., V., and VI. treat of the Philosophy of Nature, including, respectively, Geometry, Arithmetic and Algebra, the Physical Sciences, and Biological science. Professor Watson's discussions here are elucidative and exhibit very distinctly the weak points of Mill's view, that the formal sciences rest upon experience, in its restricted sense. In the discussion of biological science, the author chiefly considers "whether accepting the theory of development as the only tenable explanation of the characteristics and changes of living beings, we have reached an ultimate explanation, or whether we have only solved a subordinate problem." The author's opinion is that "the world is in no sense a product of chance, but must be conceived from the point of view of immanent teleology." Chapter VII. treats of the Relations of Biology and Philosophy; Chapter VIII. of the Philosophy of the Mind; Chapters IX., X., and XI. of Moral Philosophy; and Chapter XII. of the Philosophy of the Absolute—a treatment, it will be seen, which accords with the author's rough division of existence into the three great related spheres, of nature, mind, and ego. Although this division may for some purpose or other be economical and convenient one, it is nevertheless one which demands its justification as the outcome of a philosophical system, and not as its postulate.

In the main, the positions which Professor Watson takes in his criticisms of the three thinkers that figure in the title of his book, are strong. We may observe that Darwin is mentioned in the Table of Contents, (which does not seem to have been prepared by the author,) as "an unsophisticated scientific man," and also that a passage from *The Tempest* is incorrectly stated as being from *Midsummer Night's Dream*.

T. J. McC.

DER GEIST DER NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE. By *Robert Schellwien*. Leipsic: Alfred Janssen. 1895. Pages, 163. Price, M. 2.40.

It is difficult to get at Mr. Schellwien's ideas, which are much mixed with platitudes, and not altogether free from obscurity. Human consciousness, he says, has as its necessary and immutable presupposition unconsciousness; it can arise only by proceeding from unconsciousness. All knowledge of man, therefore, is the abolition of non-knowledge. Of the advance from unconsciousness to consciousness, from non-knowledge to knowledge the fundamental form is the relation of subject and object, where subject is contrasted to object but seeks always to annihilate that opposition. Here the *negative* character of knowledge is exhibited. In self-con-